Urban Mortgage Lending: Comparative Markets and Experience by J. E. Morton
This PDF is a selection from an out-of-print volume from the National Bureau
of Economic Research
Volume Title: Urban Mortgage Lending: Comparative Markets and Experience





Chapter Title: LENDING EXPERIENCE
Chapter Author: J. E. Morton
Chapter URL: http://www.nber.org/chapters/c2851
Chapter pages in book: (p. 89 - 122)LENDING EXPERIENCE
DATA Ofl the characteristics of mortgages that have been extin-
guished are even scarcer and more deficient than data on loans still
outstanding. This paucity of evidence on past lending practices and
lending experience is the more surprising as such information is
essential to the exploration of some of the most important problems
confronting individual lending institutions and the agencies respon.-
sible for policy on a national level in the vast field of housing and
housing credit. An attempt was made, therefore, as part of the
National Bureau's survey of urban mortgage finance, to obtain data
on extinct loans through a sampling of lenders' files, in the hope that
—with data on active loans reported by the same institutions—
representative information on nonfarm mortgage loans made since
1920, and on the outcome of such of the transactions as had been
completed, would be at hand.
Sampling the inactive files of lenders is, of course, a more difficult
and complex task than canvassing the files of active loans. The
historical information kept varies greatly from institution to institu-
tion in amount and in kind, and is generally much less complete
than information available for current loans. For these and related
reasons the limitations of the historical part of the National Bureau's
sample are considerably greater than those affecting its sample of
active Ioans.1 In addition to the fact that nonresponse by commer-
cial banks and savings and loan associations was heavier in connec-
tion with past than with current loans, the historical part of the
sample suffers from the incompleteness of the original population
from which it was drawn. A good many small lending institutions
had been wiped out as a consequence of the depression; it is not
improbable that their mortgage lending experience was worse than
average and that their exclusion from the sample has introduced
some bias. Since the extent of the bias is unknown, no correction for
it can be offered.
All 24 of the life insurance companies cooperating in the survey
supplied information on inactive as well as active loans; of the other
lenders, 116 commercial banks and 92 savings and loan associations
responded to the historical part of the questionnaire. The
See Appendix A, especially pages 126 if. arid 137.90 LENDING EXPERIENCE
sample covers some 20,000 mortgage loans made during 1920-47, of
which about two-thirds were completed transactions, and one-third
still outstanding at the survey date.2 The primary objective of the
present chapter is to reconstruct the pattern of changing lending
practices and lending experience as reflected in the sample of mort-
gage loans made since 1920 by the responding institutional lenders.
Trends in Loan Characteristics since 1920
A sustained upward movement in loan-to-value ratios and in con-
tract lengths and a downward movement in contract interest rates
have been the outstanding features of lending patterns since 1920
for the life insurance companies, commercial banks, and savings and
loan associations included in the historical part of the loan sample
(Charts 6 and 7). These tendencies appear more uniform for loans
on one- to four-family homes than for loans on income-producing
properties, though the smallness of the sample of loans of the latter
type may account in part for their more erratic behavior. The rela-
tive decline in interest rates on home mortgage loans over the period
beginning with 1920 was about the same for all three lenders.
Throughout, these rates were lowest on the loans made by life
insurance companies, slightly higher on commercial bank loans, and
highest for those made by savings and loan associations. Toward
the end of the period, however, the rate structure had become more
uniform: absolute interlender variability of rates had declined,
primarily because of the sharp fall in interest rates on loans made
by savings and loan associations from over 7 percent in 1920 to less
than 5 percent in 1946. Loans on income-producing properties in
the sample tended toward slightly lower rates, with the loans of
commercial banks showing the sharpest decline—from over 6 to
about 4 percent (Chart 7).
Bothcontract lengths and loan-to-value ratios increased perceptibly
for all three lenders, and for loans on homes and on income-produc-
ing properties as well. For home mortgage loans the interlender
variability both of contract lengths and of loan-to-value ratios was
less at the end of the period than at the beginning. For contract
2Thecut-off date varied somewhat for the different lenders; see Chapter 4,
footnote 3. Appendix Tables A-9 through A-14 show the composition of the
historical part of the sample in detail.
A sample of mortgage loans made since 1918 by mutual savings banks has
been analyzed by John Lintner in Mutual Savings Banks in the Savings and
Mortgage Markets (Harvard University, 1948), to which reference will be made
in connection with foreclosure experience.LENDING EXPERIENCE
CHART 6
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Contract Terms of Straight Mortgage Loans Made on Norifarm Homes 1921-47
Life insurance companies
Savings and loan associations
Commercial banks
Three-year moving averages of interest rates, contract lengths, and loan-to-
value ratios, weighted by three-year moving averages of original loan amounts.
Based on sample data in Tables C-5 through C-7; refers to loans secured by
one- to four-family homes.
Contract Interest Rates
Loan-to-Value Ratios





Three-year moving averages of interest rates, contract lengths, and loan-to-
value ratios, weighted by three-year moving averages of original loan amounts.
Based on sample data in Tables C-8 through C-1O; refers to loans secured by
properties other than one- to four-family homes.
92 LENDING EXPERIENCE
CHART 7
Contract TermsofStraight Mortgage Made on Nonfarm Income-
Producing Properties 1921-46
Lifeinsurance companies — Commercial banks
—'
w
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Loon-to-Value Ratios
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length of loans on income-producing properties, however, the oppo-
site was found, a fact which appears attributable to the propor-
tionately greater absorption of FHA-insured loans into the portfolios
of life insurance companies than of commercial banks. To the extent
that high loan-to-value ratios and long contract terms are indicative
of liberality of credit, savings and loan associations appear to have
been the most liberal home mortgage lender at the beginning of the
period. At the end of the period, however, life insurance company
home loans showed loan-to-value ratios equal with, and average
contract lengths far exceeding, those of savings and loan associations.
By the same criteria, commercial banks were least liberal almost
throughout, and at the end of the period life insurance companies
had become the most liberal lender in the home mortgage market.
Again, this reflects the fact that life insurance companies utilized
government insurance or guaranty in a larger proportion of their
home mortgage lending than other lenders did.
Among loans secured by income-producing properties (a field in
which savings and loan associations participated very little) the
lengthening of contract terms proceeded much more rapidly in the
case of life insurance companies than of commercial banks. Thus the
sample reflects a division of the market into a large-property sector
mainly consisting of government-insured mortgages and served by
life insurance companies, and a small-property sector mainly con-
sisting of conventionally financed nonresidential properties and
served by commercial banks (Chart 7).
Changes in the average size of loans made by the various types
of lender confirm the main tendencies already observed. Throughout
the period beginning with 1920 and ending with 1947, home mort-
gage loans of life insurance companies averaged larger than those
of commercial banks, and very much larger than those of savings
and loan associations (Table 37). Over the period as a whole, and
for all three lenders, there was a pronounced tendency toward
higher original loan amounts. This rising tendency in mortgage size
was steepest for savings and loan associations; next came commercial
banks, and last life insurance companies—again a development
resulting in greater uniformity among the different types of institu-
tional lender at the end of the period than at its beginning.
For mortgages on income-producing properties, however, differ-
ences in loan size as between the several types of lender were larger,
at the beginning of the period, than for home mortgages; and the





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































such loans made by life insurance companies from 1920 through
1946 was over twice that of similar loans made by commercial banks;
and in turn, the average size of commercial bank loans on income-
producing properties was five times that of similar loans made by
savings and loan associations.
Over-All Foreclosure Record
The most dramatic and painful aspects of the lending experience
of all types of lender were brought about by the repercussions of
the Great Depression on the mortgage markets. While the effects of
the depression permeated all sectors of the mortgage market, their
force varied from lender to lender. First of all, foreclosure experi-
ence varied with the type of housing involved and with the general
economic characteristics of different areas. Thus the estimated num-
ber of nonf arm foreclosures occurring annually after was
highest in the heavily industrialized Middle Atlantic, East North
Central, and New England states; and annual rates of foreclosure
declined more slowly in the Middle Atlantic states than elsewhere
(Chart 8). Similarly, the impact of foreclosures was considerably
heavier on large communities than on small ones. Foreclosure rela-
tives—expressing estimated foreclosures on all nonfarm properties
annually during 1934-41 as percentages of the number of nonfarm
residential structures in 1940—show up always higher the larger
the community size group, being nearly 2 percent for the largest
urban centers in 1934 and 1935 (Table 38)Throughoutthe post-
depression period foreclosure relatives were higher than the national
average in places with 20,000 residential structures or more—heavily
urban areas—and less than the average for the rest. However, annual
foreclosure relatives declined more rapidly for large than for small
communities. Consistent with the record is the fact that the National
Bureau's sample shows foreclosure rates to have been highest for
life insurance companies and large commercial banks, both of which
held a substantial proportion of their mortgages on properties in
Breakdowns of Home Loan Bank Board foreclosure estimates by location of
loss are available only from 1934 on.
Being based on estimates of foreclosures on non.farm properties of all types,
of which about one-seventh are commercial rather than home properties, the
relatives in Table 38 somewhat exceed the true foreclosure ratios for home
mortgages. But the contrast between the mid-thirties and the later years is by
no means exaggerated. Since the 1940 inventory was taken as the basis through-
out, the high foreclosure ratios of the early years are probably understated in










Data by theOperatingAnalysis Division of the Federal Savings and
Loan Insurance Corporation.
CHART 8
Foreclosures on Nonfarm Properties of All Types, by Region, 1934-47
Thøusondsof foreclosuresUnder 5,000- 20,000- 60,000
















1934 0.41 0.57 1.16
1935 0.39 0.56 1.15
1936 0.40 0.49 0.99
1937 0.37 0.47 0.83
1938 0.28 0.36 0.60
1939 0.24 0.27 0.50
1940 0.18 0.20 0.38
1941 0.15 0.16 0.30
Compiled from Nonf arm Real Estate Foreclosures (monthly reports of the
Federal Home Loan Bank Board), and from data supplied by the Federal
Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation on the number of nonfarm homes
within each size group in 1940.
Size classification of communities is by number of nonfarm homes.
million inhabitants. The corresponding foreclosure rates were sub-
stantially higher than for smaller metropolitan districts and for non-
metropolitan areas.5 Similarly, for sample loans by life insurance
companies on properties in the Middle Atlantic and the East North
Central states foreclosure rates were substantially higher than in the
rest of the country.
For small commercial banks and savings and loan associations,
which as a rule catered to a market more diversified geographically
and by size of community than that of the larger institutions, fore-
closure experience appears to have been more favorable. However,
it should be remembered that the high mortality rate among small
lending institutions during the depression may have introduced a
R. J. Saulnier, Urban Mortgage Lending by Life Insurance Companies
(National Bureau of Economic Research, Financial Research Program, 1950),
Table 25, p. 87.
For commercial banks and savings and loan associations the bias of non-
response in the historical partofthe sample was too pronounced to permit
construction of estimates for geographic distributions.
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large places and in the heavily industrialized parts of the country.
For example, two-thirds of the home mortgage loans made by life
insurance companies before the depression, and an even larger
proportion of loans on income-producing properties, were on col-
lateral located in metropolitan districts with more than one-quarter
TABLE 38
Foreclosures on Nonfarm Properties of All Types,
Annually 1934-41, per Hundred Nonfarm Homes
in 1940, by Size of Community98 LENDING EXPERIENCE
downward bias in the foreclosure estimates based on their loan
samples.
Aside from the record of foreclosures, there are no aggregate data
pertinent to an analysis of lenders' experience by type of institution
and by loan characteristics. In the sections to follow, based entirely
on sample material, the limitations mentioned earlier should be kept
in mind. The survey results, especially where they refer to commer-
cial banks and savings and loan associations, should be considered
suggestive rather than conclusive. Although tabulations will usually
cover the full time span, the findings on which the discussion is
based are derived chiefly from the characteristics of loans made
before 1930, since for later years the proportion of uncompleted
transactions grows higher, and the sample accordingly thinner from
the standpoint of an experience study.
Determinants of Foreclosure
Before the depression, the year a loan was made appears to have
been one of the most outstanding determinants of the outcome of
lending operations. For all three lenders included in the survey,
foreclosure rates increased rapidly as the year in which the loan
was made approached the peak of the mortgage financing boom in
1929 (Chart 9) .°Moreover,for each lender annual average fore-
closure rates reached or exceeded the average for the entire period
1920 to 1947 as early as 1924 and remained above it until 1933
(Table 39). Thus the entire period 1925-32 was one of substantially
higher than average foreclosure rates. However, the sustained and
rapid increases of these rates during the years 1926-29 suggest that
the factors most directly and uniformly associated with waves of
foreclosures were those which usually appear during a boom—
namely, high real estate values, high incomes, and a large volume
of credit.
With respect to type of property, foreclosure experience was more
favorable with mortgages on one- to four-family homes than on
income-producing properties (Tables 39 and 40). For loans made
during the five-year period before 1930, commercial banks, in par-
ticular, fared twice as badly with loans on income-producing proper-
ties as with loans secured by homes. The experience of savings and
The same general pattern emerges if we confine the tabulations to loans
outstanding at the beginning of the depression in 1930 (Table C-12). As would
be expected, individual foreclosure rates are then uniformly higher, since the
preponderantly good loans extinguished before 1930 have been excluded.LENDING EXPERIENCE 99
loan associations with home loans made during 1925-29 closely
resembled that of commercial banks. Life insurance companies
experienced substantially higher foreclosure rates than other lenders,
CHART 9
Foreclosure Rates by Year Loan Made: Nonfarm Home Mortgage Loans, 1920-47
Percent Life Insurance Companies
I I I
Based on sample data in Table 39; refers to loans secured by one- to four-
family homes. Foreclosure rate is the percentage ratio of the number of loans
made in a given year and foreclosed by date of report (1947) to all loans made
in that year.
especially with loans on one- to four-family homes, and the same is
true for one group among the commercial banks—the medium-sized
institutions, with portfolios of $2 million to $7.8 million. In the case
of life insurance companies, experience appears to have been par-
15
Commercial Banks
1920 '25 '30 '35 '40 '45'47100 LENDING EXI'ERIENCE
TABLE 39
Foreclosure Rates for Mortgage Loans on Nonfarm
Homes, 1920-47, by Year Loan Made




No. Amt. No. Arnt. No. Arnt.
1920-24 .5.3% 8.0% 2.7% 3.4% 3.4% 4.1%
1920 2.7 6.2 2.2 2.1 2.9 4.0
1921 1.7 4.9 2.5 2.3 1.2 1.4
1922 2.4 3,2 2.1 2.0 0.9 0.3
1923 5.7 7.9 1.6 2.5 4.7 5.3
1924 8.9 12.0 4.2 5.6 6.1 7.1
1925-29 20.9 23.0 10.3 11.5 11.6 12.9
1925 13.4 15.0 9.2 10.8 11.5 9.5
1926 18.0 19.6 9.3 8.9 10.9 11.0
1927 22.2 21.8 9.9 11.1 9.1 9.0
1.928 24.1 28.5 12.1 14.1 14.3 15.1
1929 26.4 29.6 11.5 13.7 11.9 19.2
1930-34 17.4 21.1 5.1 6.4 10.4 14.0
1930 20.4 22.0 5.2 6.4 14.8 17.7
1931 19.3 23.9 7.1 9.0 8.5 12.0
1932 9.7 16.7 6.7 4.6 12.2 11.3
1933 0 0 2.5 2.5 7.1 12.2
1934 6.1 5.2 0 0 3.0 9.7
1935-39 1.8 2.0 0.6 1.1 1.2 2.0
1935 3.4 3.4 0.8 0.8 1.0 1.2
1936 2.0 2.5 0 0 0.8 3.5
1937 1.8 1.8 2.0 5.0 1.8 3.8
1938 2.0 1.7 0 0 1.3 1.2
1939 1.2 1.9 0.3 0.1 1.0 0.6
1940-47 0.2 0.2 0 0 0.1 0.1
1940 0.4 0.4 0 0 0.5 1.1
1941 0.2 0.1 0 0 0 0
1942 0.4 0.3 0 0 0 0
1943 0.4 0.4 0 0 0 0
1944-47 0 0 0 0 0.1 0.1
1920-47 7.9% 9.3% 2.8% 3.4% 3.8% 4.2%
Based on National Bureau of Economic Research survey of urban mortgage
lending; for coverage see the opening of Chapter 5. Refers to loans secured by
one- to four-family homes. Foreclosure rate is the number or original amount
of loans made in a given year and foreclosed before date of report (1947) as a
percentage of all loans made in that year. For number and original amount of
sampled loans, see Table A-9.LENDING EXPERIENCE 101
TABLE 40
Foreclosure Rates for Mortgage Loans on Nonfa.rm
Income-Producing Properties, 1920-47,









No. Amt. No. Amt. No. Amt.
1920-24 9.3% 7.8% 2.3% 0.2% 1.5% 1.1%
1925-29 26.8 34.7 16.9 19.8 17.4 10.1
1930-34 14.8 8.8 7.2 2.2 0 0
1935-39 0.7 0.4 8.5 7.3 0 0
1940-47 0.9 0.1 0.3 a 0 0
1920-47 11.1% 13.1% 5.8% 4.2% 6.3% 3.0%
Based on National Bureau of Economic Research survey of urban mortgage
lending; for coverage, see the opening of Chapter 5. Refers to loans secured by
properties other than one- to four-family homes. Foreclosure rate is the number
or original anmunt of loans made in a given period and foreclosed before date
of report (1947) as a percentage of all loans made in that period. For number
and original amount of sampled loans, see Table A-b.
Less than 0.05 percent.
licularly bad with the two- to four-family homes and with apart-
ment buildings.7
In general, foreclosure experience with loans on income-producing
properties was slightly more uniform among the different types of
lender than experience with loans on homes (Tables 39 and 40).
Also, a comparison of foreclosure rates based on number of loans
with rates based on original amounts of loans reveals that the loans
made from 1925 through 1929 on income-producing properties and
later foreclosed were substantially larger than average loans; and
that they were larger for life insurance companies than for com-
mercial banks. Foreclosed loans on one- to four-family homes were
also larger than the average loan made during 1925-29, but only
slightly so, and with greater uniformity among the three lenders.
The home loan market suffered less from the adverse effects of the
depression than the market for loans on income-producing proper-
ties. Tabulations not reproduced here show that among surviving
institutions the savings and loan associations and the smaller com-
mercial banks had a somewhat less unfavorable experience than
their larger competitors.
Among the factors other than the location of a property and the
year in which the loan was originated that affect foreclosure experi-
Ibid., Table 24, p. 86.102 LENDING EXPERIENCE
ence, amortization and the loan-to-value ratio seem to have been most
important. Foreclosure indexes8 show that fully amortized home
loans were better risks in terms of foreclosure experience than other
mortgages (Table 41). For the sample of life insurance companies,
however, a breakdown of the period 1920-29 into two subperiods
indicates that the advantage of the fully amortized type of loan
diminished during the later phases of the expansion.9 This suggests
that amortization was a protective device primarily for seasoned
loans, but that it had little effect where loans encountered difficulties
early in their contract life. The impression is reinforced by the fact
that the sample loans made during 1925-29 by savings and loan asso-
ciations and commercial banks on income-producing properties—
that is, the typical short-lived loans—performed worse than their
loans as a whole (Tables 39 and 40). In general, loans of relatively
small size as compared with the appraised values of the underlying
properties showed better foreclosure experience than loans with
high loan-to-value ratios (Table 41). Differentiation in that respect
among loans made by commercial banks was especially pronounced,
suggesting that these institutions were able to acquire high quality
loans with low loan-to-value ratios.
Small loans, of less than $5,000, performed better than average,
though less well than mortgages of all sizes for which the loan-to-
value ratio was low. Thus, the data would imply that loans of large
original amount, in particular those with high loan-to-value ratios,
and on which repayment had been relatively small at the time of
foreclosure, presented the greatest foreclosure risks.
The above tendencies are revealed more explicitly if we observe
some of the effects of age, size, amortization provision, and loan-to-
value ratio on the foreclosure experience reflected by the most uni-
form and best part of the National Bureau's sample, i.e. the data on
mortgage loans made by large life insurance companies in the
twenties and still outstanding in 1930 that were secured by single
family owner-occupied homes (Table 42). In particular the tabula-
tion shows that the relative frequency of foreclosures varied directly
with size of loan for all observed years for both of the loan-to-value
classes examined; similarly, that foreclosure rates during each period
8 See Table 41 for definition of the measure used. The indexes measure rela-
tive risk of foreclosure for subcategories of loans within each lender group, 100
being the average for the group or for a subperiod within it.
° The same conclusions can be drawn if the analysis is limited to loans that
were outstanding in 1930.LENDING EXPERIENCE 103
TABLE 41
Foreclosure Indexes for Mortgage Loans Made on










Fully amortized 23 102 b
Partial or no amortization 131 100 b
1925-29
Fully amortized 51 86 b
Partial or no amortization 113 103 b
1920-29
Fully amortized 44 90 103
Partial or no amortization 117 102 51
CONTRACT INTEREST BATE
5.0 -5.9% 76 89 26
6.0-6.9 107 111 83
7.0 and over 76 49 117
CONTRACT LENCTHC
0-4 years 135 107 40
5-14 89 86 101
15 and over 178 47 280
LOAN-TO-VALUE RATIO
Less than 40% 49 35 38
40 and over 106 114 113
ORIGINAL LOAN AMOUNT
Less than $5,000 71 b 97







Based on National Bureau of Economic Research survey of urban mortgage
lending; for coverage, see the opening of Chapter 5. Refers to loans secured by
one- to four-family homes; for number of sampled loans, see Tables A-li
and A-12.
The foreclosure index is defined as
1001!.
whereis the number of foreclosed loans, andthe number of good loans (i.e.
nonforeclosed loans)in the jthsubgroupof the variable, and where the
summation extends over all subgroups included: e.g. all loans—with full, or
partial, or no amortization—made in a given period by a given type of lender.
Loans secured by all types of property are included, 95 percent being loans
on one- to four-family homes.
b Not available.
°Excludesloans with indefinite maturities, e.g. share accumulation plan loans
made by savings and loan associations.104 LENDING EXPERiENCE
TABLE 42
Foreclosure Rates on Life Insurance Company Home Loans Made
1920-29 and Outstanding January 1, 1930, by Amortization





Under 50% 50% & Over TOTAL
TYPE OF LOAN
1920-24 6.1% 23.8% 14.4%
Fully amortized a 18.2b 10.Ob
Partially amortized 5.8 20.4 11.4
Nonamortized 1O.5b 3Ø5b 23.6
1 925-27 15.7 24.2 20.9
Fully amortized 4•5b 17.3 13.5
Partially amortized 16.6 23,4 20.3
Nonamortized 18.1 27.5 24.6
1928-29 10.5 29.5 23.4
Fully amortized 16.lb 10.6b
Partially amortized 10.4 29.3 22.9
Nonamortized 16.7b 34.8 30.2
1920-29 12.4 26.2 20.9
Fully amortized 2.lb 17.0 12.0
Partially amortized 12.7 25.8 20.1
Nonamortized 15.3 30.0 28.1
ORIGINAL LOAN AMOUNT
1 920-25 10.5% 19.9% 15.2%
Under $5,000 9.3 18.0 13.7
$5,000 and over 13.5 24.6 19.2
1926-27 15.6 26.5 22.5
Under $5,000 12.1 22.7 18.8
$5,000 and over 21.4 32.5 28.5
1928-29 10.5 29.5 23.4
Under $5,000 6.4 27.6 20.7
$5,000 and over 17.1 32.2 37.5
1920-29 12.4 26.2 20.9
Under $5,000 9.5 23.3 17.9
$5,000 and over 17.6 31.1 26.2
Based on National Bureau of Economic Research survey of urban mortgage
lending; for coverage, see the opening of Chapter 5. Refers to life company
loans madethe twenties that we.re secured by one- to four-family homes.
Foreclosure rate is the number of loans foreclosed during 1930-47 as a per-
centage of all loans outstanding at the beginning of 1930.
aNotshown because less than ten loans included.
b Based on less than fifty loans.
varied directly with loan-to-value ratios within each size class of
loans; and that foreclosure rates varied inversely with age of loan,
and inversely with degree of amortization. It also points to the
tendency for the highest foreclosure rates to concentrate in groups
of loans that exceeded $5,000, had loan-to-value ratios of 50 percentLENDING EXPERIENCE 105
or more, and were made during the latter part of the twenties
(Table 42).
Insurance companies had better than average foreclosure ex-
perience with loans on which interest rates ranged from 5to5.9
percent; high interest rate loans—that is, those carrying rates of
7 percent or over—were the best foreclosure risk group for commer-
cial banks, but the worst for savings and loan associations (Table
41). This suggests that in the market for high risk home mortgages
commercial banks absorbed the best loans, and that at least some
of the savings and loan associations may have absorbed the worst.
Foreclosure experience on long-term mortgages, those with con-
tract terms of fifteen years or longer, was worse than average for
life insurance companies and especially poor for savings and loan
associations (Table 41); but the entire sample of home mortgage
loans made before 1930 included only 132 with such long terms.
With mortgages having contract lengths of less than fifteen years,
for two of the three lenders good foreclosure experience did not
coincide with the contract lengths they typically used. Thus, com-
mercial banks, which during the twenties had specialized in short-
term loans, fared worst on loans with contract lengths of less than
five years; and savings and loan associations had their best fore-
closure experience with such loans, though terms of more than ten
years were predominant in their lending. Not only with contract
lengths but in general, a comparison of foreclosure indexes for the
various loan categories with the frequency distributions of loans
made by each lender within those categories suggests that lending
institutions were frequently more selective, or at any rate more
successful, with respect to mortgage transactions lying outside their
established lending spheres than with mortgages conforming more
closely to their established policies.bo It also appears—always in
terms of foreclosure experience with home mortgage loans made
before 1930—that the different loan characteristics were of varying
usefulness in discriminating between good and bad loans. In gen-
eral, most of the characteristics examined were less effective dis-
criminators for loans made by life insurance companies than by
commercial banks or, especially, by savings and loan associations.
This would suggest that commercial banks and savings and loan
associations had more nearly uniform lending habits and policies
than insurance companies as a group.
10SeeTable A-12.106 LENDING EXPERIENCE
The foreclosure experience of life insurance companies was most
sensitive to amortization provision, size of loan, and loan-to-value
ratio; that of commercial banks and savings and loan associations to
the usual contract terms—loan-to-value ratio, interest rate, and con-
tract length. By and large, the characteristics examined are more
effective in screening out good than bad loans. This, of course, is not
necessarily an attribute of the selected characteristic but may also
be due to the particular scale used; that is, to the boundaries set
in grouping the loans. However, the sample data more or less suggest
that it is easier to recognize a good loan than a bad one. To signalize
the latter, much more efficient indicators would be needed, quite
possibly involving many other factors and their complex interactions.
Thus analysis of foreclosure rates,1' rather than directly assisting in
the rejection of bad loans, would seem to be more helpful in pointing
out the limitations—at least for the period under study—of some of
the time-honored lending criteria.
Many of the observations made with respect to the foreclosure
experience of life insurance companies, commercial banks, and sav-
ings and loan associations are confirmed for mutual savings banks
by Lintner's study of sample loans made in Massachusetts.12 For
mutual savings banks, too, considering loans made before 1932,
experience was far better with mortgages on residential property,
especially on single family owner-occupied homes, than with those
on income-producing properties. With respect to the year a loan was
made, foreclosure rates for the mutuals also increased during the
period leading up to the depression and reached their peak for loans
made during the immediate predepression years 1927-29. Foreclosure
frequency varied directly with size of loan, and—as in the case of
mortgage lending by the other three lenders—amortized loans per-
formed better than others; likewise, the foreclosure rate varied
directly with loan-to-value ratios.
In addition, the data for mutual savings banks throw some light
on the effect of two geographic characteristics: community size, and
distance of lender from the mortgaged property. For mortgages on
single family homes foreclosure experience was worse the larger the
11 For additional material on foreclosures, see Appendix Tables C-il and
C-12.
12 John Lintner, Mutual Savings Banks in the Savings andMortgageMarkets
(Harvard University, 1948). The sample, drawn at approximately the same
time as the National Bureau's and covering loans made from January 1, 1918 to
October 31, 1945, is described in pages 440ff., and the findings summarized
here are developed in pages 359-439.LENDING EXPERIENCE 107
community. With respect to distance, experience was better the
closer the lender to the mortgaged collateral. These findings are
based, of course, on experience with uninsured loans only. To what
extent the insurance feature of loans made under FHA protection
would have weakened the effect of city size and of distance cannot
be ascertained from present sources. The point gains added interest
when it is recalled that long-distance lenders—for example, the large
life insurance companies—made use of FHA insurance earlier and
more freely than some of the other lenders.
Among factors other than those already discussed, borrower
characteristics and socio-economic aspects of the locality and the
neighborhood of the property would seem to be of particular interest
in an analysis of foreclosure rates. Unfortunately, the requisite data
are for all practical purposes nonexistent. It is, of course, extremely
difficult to obtain historical information on borrower characteristics
from any lender; and it proved impossible to reconstruct lending
experience in terms of comparable borrower characteristics for an
adequate loan sample from the past records of a representative
group of lending institutions. It was possible, however, to obtain
data for a limited group of loans indicative of foreclosure experience
during the depression in one particular sector of the home mortgage
market—namely, for loans acquired by the Home Owners' Loan
Corporation, chiefly in 1934. These loans came from the portfolios of
a great many different lenders and therefore provide adequate
coverage with respect to type of lender. Two important limitations
attach to them as a source of information on borrower characteristics.
Since the loans refinanced by the HOLC, though not the worst, were
likely to be poorer than average risks, they are not representative
of all home mortgage loans outstanding during the early thirties.
Moreover, the National Bureau's sample of HOLC loans is geo-
graphically limited, being restricted to loans made in Connecticut,
New Jersey, and New York. The fact that nearly four-tenths of the
sample loans were still outstanding at the time of the survey (1947)
hardly affects the basic conclusions with respect to foreclosure
experience, since only a negligible number of foreclosures occurred
from 1947 until the liquidation of the HOLC in May 1951.
Accordingly, the HOLC sample can be used for the reconstruction
of experience with probably worse than average risks among home
mortgages made before the depression or during its early phases by108 LENDING EXPERIENCE
a variety of lending institutions in parts of the highly industrial
Northeast.13
In the HOLC data, foreclosure rates are closely related to size of
loan. A classification of loans by size (six groups at $2,000 intervals)
within family income shows a tendency at all income levels toward
worse experience the larger the loan. But eliminating the effect of
loan size shows that borrower's income was also an important factor
in the outcome of the lending Within nearly all loan
size groups a tendency was observed for foreclosure rates to decrease
with increasing income, though lessso in the highest income
groups)-5
Both the very young borrowers (under thirty years at the time the
loan was refinanced) and the older ones (fifty years and over) were
less successful in avoiding foreclosure of their homes, than the
middle-aged group; nearly one-half of the sampled loans to mort-
gagors under thirty years were foreclosed.'6 Thus economic pressure
on borrowers at an early stage of their earning careers and on those
at a late stage had a clear effect on the outcome of the lending
operation.
The ratio of borrower's estimated equity in the mortgaged prop-
erty to the original amount of the loan was inversely associated
with foreclosure rates for all but the smallest and the very large
mortgages; in other words, relatively large equity apparently was
effective in avoiding default by a borrower, though even here the
influence exerted by the absolute size of the economic burden—that
is, the size of the loan—was more pronounced and
In the low income group of mortgagors large families (seven
dependents and more) were the best foreclosure risks, but the
absolutely best risks with respect to family size in the entire sample
were the small families(no dependents) in the high income
brackets.18
Thus, the socio-economic status of the borrower as reflected by
income, age, and size of family, and the relative financial importance
18Fordetailed tabulation and analysis of foreclosure experience, see History
and Policies of the Home Owners' Loan Corporation, by C. Lowell Harriss
(National Bureau of Economic Research, Financial Research Program, 1951),
pp. 87-100. The sample is described on pages 49f.
14Ibid.,Table 23, p. 89.
15Theincome figures used were family income at the time the loan was
refinanced,mainly 1934.
16Harriss,op. Table 24, p. 90.
Ibid.,Table 30, p. 98.
18Ibid.,Table 23, p. 89.LENDING EXPERIENCE 109
ofthe property to the borrower—the latter as expressed by the ratio
of equity to original loan amount—were all more or less effective
elements in loan experience. The most obvious element, however—
borrower's income—only proved to be a satisfactory discriminator
between good and bad loans for the larger mortgages ($4,000 or
more); that is, for loans that were generally poorer than average
risks. For smaller loans the borrower's family income at the time
the loan was acquired by the HOLC was not significantly associated
with loan experience; other characteristics must have accounted for
the defaults of these mortgages.19 Although over-all experience does
suggest that the middle income brackets were somewhat better
foreclosure risks than either the high or the low income groups, this
result was due apparently to the particular shape of the joint dis-
tribution of incomes and loan sizes prevailing at that time.2°
Loss Experience
The possibility that a loan may default is only one of several
considerations that enter into a lender's appraisal of risks. More
important to him than the mere fact of foreclosure is the gravity of
the default as indicated by the ultimate financial outcome of the
loan transaction. The financial outcome of an unsuccessful mortgage
transaction is determined by happenings not only during the life of
the loan but also throughout the subsequent period during which
the property acquired is part of the lender's owned real estate
account. For this reason, a description of a lender's experience that
seeks to gauge the amount of risk, rather than its mere frequency,
will have to consider the combined outcome of both phases of a
mortgage transaction: experience with the loan while it is active
and, if the loan resulted in foreclosure, experience with the acquired
collateral until the lender has disposed of it.
In order to compare differentials in the loss experience of various
lenders on defaulted loans in the National Bureau's sample, the
estimated net proceeds of all operations subsequent to foreclosure
10Inconnection with other factors that may influence experience, an HOLC
tabulation of reasons for foreclosure, covering foreclosures in afl regions of the
country up to mid-1944, is of interest. The agency found that only one-sixth
of the foreclosures were attributable to "total inability to pay," a slightly
smaller proportion to "abandonment of property," "death of borrower," or "legal
complications," and two-thirds to "noncooperation of borrower" and "obstinate
refusal to pay" (Harriss, op. cit., Table 21, p. 80).
20 The same result was observed for a roughly comparable exposure period
with respect to FHA loans. See Foreclosure Experience with Insured Mortgages,
byMortimerKaplan (Federal Housing Administration, ms., 1941), pp. 217ff.110 LENDING EXPERIENCE
were subtracted from an estimate of the lender's investment at time
of foreclosure for each completed transaction. The resulting loss
figure was then related to the original amount of the loan, and to
the lender's investment at the time of foreclosure.
It appears that the average loss ratios on all loans made after
1920 and foreclosed by 1947 were highest for commercial banks and
lowest for life insurance companies. This was true both for loans
secured by homes and for those secured by income-producing prop-
erties (Table 43). Thus, for commercial banks, losses on foreclosed
loans on one- to four-family homes were about one-fourth of the
original loan amount, and on income-producing properties, over one-
third. Even life insurance companies, which according to the sample
fared best, had substantial average loss ratios—in the neighborhood
of one-tenth. Comparing loss experience with the foreclosure rates
and foreclosure indexes discussed earlier, it would appear that com-
mercial banks and savings and loan associations were more success-
ful than life insurance companies in selecting good risks in the sense
of loans that did not default, but that the savings and loan associa-
tions and especially the commercial banks were much less successful
than the life insurance companies in their handling of acquired
properties. An explanation of these differences between institutions
might be found in the possible advantages of large-scale operation
with respect to property management and sale, and of small-scale,
local operations with respect to loan selection and servicing. Dif-
ferences in the cost of foreclosure to the lender and in the proceeds
of deficiency judgments may also have contributed to the differences
in loss experience.
For each type of lender, and for each major property type, loans
made after 1925 and subsequently foreclosed had higher loss ratios
the longer the property was outstanding and the later it was sold,
which suggests that easily disposable properties did not remain long
in the owned real estate accounts but that less attractive collateral
did.
Similarly, the difference between loss as a percent of original loan
amount and the (smaller) rate of loss as a percent of the lender's
investment at foreclosure was highest for loans on properties sold
after 1935. Since the difference between the two ratios varies
directly with foreclosure expenses (including noncapitalized delin-
quent interest and taxes paid by lender at the time of foreclosure,
etc.), and inversely with borrowers' repayments up to time of fore-
closure, it would appear that lenders found it generally difficult orLENDING EXPERIENCE 111
TABLE 43
Liquidation Experience on Foreclosed Nonfarm Mortgage
Loans by Period of Property Disposal


















MADE DISPOSAL Cos. BanksAssocs. Cos. BanksAssocs.
Loss as Percent of Original Loan Amount
1920-24 1930-47 4% 19% 23% 23% a a
1930-34 12 a
1935-39 5 19 26 a a a
1940-47 20 a 57
1925-29 1925-47 9 24 10 14 34% 26%
1925-29 a a a a
1930-34 4 10 7 a a a
1935-39 7 24 9 17 29 24
1940-47 12 37 14 24 40
1930-34 1930-47 12b 28 22 —13 22
1930-34 —2 a 13 a
1935-39 11 17 23 a a
1940-47 15 32 —20 a
1935-39 1935-47 8 15 14 a 48
1935-39 a a a
1940-47 8 15 a a
1940-47 1940-47 6 a a a
Total 9% 24% 14% 13% 38% 27%
Loss as Percent of Lender's Investment
1920-24 1930-47 5% 19% 19% 16% a a
1930-34 11 a
1935-39 6 16 23 a a a
1940-47 2 21 a 44
1925-29 1925-47 9 21 9 13 31% 25%
1925-29 a a a a
1930-34 4 10 7 a a a
1935-39 7 20 9 —17 29 23
1940-47 11 32 12 22 38
1930-34 1930-47 lib 23 20 —11 10
1930-34 —2 a 12 a
1935-39 9 14 21 a a
1940-47 13 a 31 —17 a
1935-39 1935-47 8 16 13 55
1935-39 a a a
1940-47 8 16 a a 77
1940-47 1940-47 5 a a a
Total 9% 21% 13% 12% 33% 26%
Based on National Bureau of Economic Research survey of urban mortgage lending;
for coverage, see the opening of Chapter 5. For number of foreclosed loans, original
amount, and lender's investment, see Table C-13. Negative loss ratios indicate gains.
a Not shown because less than five loans included.
b Includes one loan for which period of property disposal was not available.112 LENDINGEXPERIENCE
unattractive to part with real estate acquired through foreclosure of
mortgages with high unpaid balances. This tendency was more
pronounced for commercial banks than for life insurance companies,
which reflects probable differences in policy between the large and
the small lenders, and the presence of a higher proportion of not
fully amortized and of delinquent loans in the portfolios of com-
mercial banks than of insurance companies.
Investor Returns in Urban Mortgage Lending
The loss ratios considered so far pertained to experience with
foreclosed mortgages only. A convenient and summary means for
analyzing over-all investment experience is the average return ac-
tually realized by various types of lender on different groups of
loans that include successful and unsuccessful transactions. In addi-
tion, the amount by which the rate of realized return falls short of
what is termed here the expected yield, and which would have been
realized if the terms promised in the original contract had been ful-
filled, serves as an approximate measure of the per annum loss rate:
that is, the rate at which reserves should have been accumulated to
have offset the full amount of losses incurred. Thus interlender
variations in loss rates according to the various characteristics of
the loan contracts, the types of properties securing them, or the
periods in which the loans were made summarize in a simple and
compact way the risk differentials associated with different types of
loan investment.
The actual measurement of return on investment, however, pre-
sents numerous and difficult problems. Since comparison within the
lending experience reflected by thousands of sample loans was the
primary purpose of the National Bureau survey, it seemed appro-
priate to sacrifice conceptual refinement to the exigencies of mass
survey operations. In view of the information available and the
different accounting and record-keeping practices of lenders, meas-
ures of return were computed for sample loans originated and
extinguished during 1920-47 as follows: (1) The contract interest
rate, weighted, in averaging, by the original amounts of the included
loans, gave an estimate of expected yield in the sense indicated
above. (2) The realized yield was assumed equal to the expected
yield for fully paid mortgages, except if the original contract rate
was later modified.2' For foreclosed mortgages, the realized yield
21Insuch instances the last interest rate weighted by the original amount of
the loan wasused.For details of the techniques used in calculating the realizedLENDING EXPERIENCE 113
wascomputedas the ratio of the lender's estimated net return to
his investment in the foreclosed loan, including in the transaction
the weighted financial experience both with the active loan and
with the foreclosed property while carried in the owned real estate
account.
Though these measures are only rough approximations to accurate
and conceptually refined accounting ratios, they are useful for the
comparison of broad lender groups and major types of loans. In
particular the loss rates—the excess of the expected over the realized
yield for various categories of loans—are suggestive of differences
in financial experience, even though their absolute values may suffer
from many technical shortcomings.
The realized yields on sample loans made from 1920 through 1929
(Tables 44 and 45) were generally higher for loans on homes than
on income-producing properties and generally higher for fully
amortized than for other mortgages. Since interest rates followed a
similar pattern, the expected yields are also indicated in most cases
as lower for mortgages on income-producing properties, and lower
for nonamortized loans, than for others. Comparing realized yields
as well as loss rates for the two types of lender whose experience
data suffice (Tables 44 and 45), we find that commercial banks fared
better than life insurance companies, especially with respect to
mortgages on homes.
As to contract length, both life insurance companies and com-
mercial banks had more satisfactory returns on investment with
home mortgages in the ten- to fourteen-year contract length group
than with other loans (Table 46). In general, loan categories for
which the average expected yield was comparatively high fared
better than others with respect to both realized yields and loss rates
(Table 46). Since foreclosure experience (Tables 41 and C-12) did
not follow the same pattern, this would suggest that, as a group,
loans with interest rates at 6 to 6.9 percent, though frequently
displaying higher foreclosure rates, produced better returns on
investment than loans with either low or very high interest rates.22
yields, see Urban Mortgage Lending by Life Insurance Companies, by R. J.
Saulnier, pp. 96ff.
22Similarly,realized yields and loss rates indicate that the financial experience
of life insurance companies was less satisfactory with loans having low loan-to-
value ratios than with others, though in terms of foreclosure rates alone the
reverse is found.114 LENDINGEXPERIENCE
TABLE44
Yieldsand Loss Rates for Mortgage Loans on Nonfarm
Homes,1920-47, by Period Loan Made and


















1920-24 5.99% 5.81% 0.18% 6.14%5.99% 0.15%
Fully amortized 6.04 6.01 0.03 8.17 6.06 0.11
Partially amortized 5.97 5.81 0.16 6.03 5.84 0.19
Nonaxnortized 5.96 5.55 0.41 6.26 6.13 0.13
1925-29 5.89 5.03 0.86 6.04 5.37 0.67
Fully amortized 8.01 5.44 0.57 6.31 6.17 0.14
Partially amortized 5.88 5.05 0.83 6.04 5.38 0.66
Nonamortized 5.86 4.68 1.18 5.99 5.18 0.81
1930-34 5.98 4.79 1.19 6.13 5.53 0.60
Fully amortized 5.97 4.89 1.08 6.36 6.00 0.36
Partially amortized6.02 5.08 0.94 6.05 5.46 0.59
Nonarnortized 5.87 4.07 1.80 6.13 5.41 0.72
1935-39 5.21 4.97 0.24 5.21 5.10 0.11
Fully amortized 5.25 5.15 0.10 5.42 5.42 0
Partially amortized 5.38 4.76 0.82 5.30 4.87 0.43
Nonamortized 5•37a 4.86a0.51a 5.69 5.66 0.03
FHA 4.97 4.86 0.11 4.90 4.88 0.02
1940-47 4.60 4.57 0.03 4.69 4.68 0.01
Fully amortized 4.69 4.62 0.07 4.77 4.76 0.01
Partially amortized 0.01k 4.88 4.88 0
Nonamortized b b b 5.19 5.12 0.07
FHAC 4.52 4.50 0.02 4.48 4.48 0
1920-47 5.59 5.01 0.58 5.58 5.27 0.31
Fullyamortized 5.51 5.15 0.38 5.51 5.43 0.08
Partially amortized 5.86 5.17 0.69 5.75 5.35 0.40
Nonamortized 5.84 4.76 1.08 6.01 5.46 0.55
FHAC 4.64 4.60 0.04 4.65 4.65 0
Exp.expected. Real. =realized.
Based on National Bureau of Economic Research survey of urban mortgage
lending; for coverage, see the opening of Chapter 5. Refers to loans secured by
one- to four-family homes, exclusive of loans and properties still on the books
in 1947. Average yields and loss rates are weighted by theoriginalamounts of
theincludedloans.
a Based on less than fifty loans.
b Not shown because less than ten loans included.
Includes a few VA-guaranteed loans.LENDING EXPERIENCE 115
TABLE 45
Yields and Loss Rates for Mortgage Loans on Nonfarm
Income-Producing Properties, 1920-47, by Period Loan
Made and Amortization or Insurance Provision
PERIOD MADE AND
LIFE INSURANCE COMPANIES COMMERCIAL BANKS
Exp. Real. Loss Exp. Real. Loss
TYPE OF LOAN YieldYield Rate YieldYield Rate
1920-24 5.89% 5.58% 0.31% 5.38% 5.35% 0.03%
}
5.92 5.64 0.28 6.09a 6.17a_0.08a
Nonamortized 5.40a Ø39a 5.28a5.25k
1925-29 5.51 3.81 1.70 5.96 4.94 1.02
Fully amortized 5.80a5.78a 0.02a 5•47a4.98a0.49a
Partially amortized5.59 3.54 2.05 6.15 4.20 1.95
Nonamortized 5.30 4.20 1.10 5.91 5.42 0.49
1930-34 5.5Ja 5.06a 0.45a 5.71 4.44 1.27
Fullyamortized 5.80a5.06a 0.74a 5.80a457a 1.23a Partially amortized
Nonamortized 5.19a5.06a 0.13a 5.65a 4.29a 1.36k
1935-39 4.78 4.67 0.11 4.27 3.59 0.68
Fully amortized 4.80k473a 0.07a 5.12a 4.58a0.54a
Partially amortized4.76 4.67 0.09 4.46a 2.00k 2.46a
Nonamortized b b b 3.88a 4.08k_0.20a
FHA b b b b b b
1940-47 4•33a 4.31a 0.02a 4.26 4.23 0.03
Fullyamortized 4•33a434a_0.Ola 4.54 4.53 0.01
Partially amortized4•33a4.18a0.15a 3,93a 3.88a0.05a
Nonamortized b b b 479a 4.68a0.lla
FHA b b b b b b
1920-47 5.31 4.41 0.90 5.18 4.57 0.61
Fullyamortized 4.58 4.56 0.02 5.03 4.78 0.25
Partially amortized 5.49 4.29 1.20 5.18 3.85 1.33
Nonamortized 5.37 4.61 0.76 5,21 4.87 0.34
FHA b b b b b b
Exp. = expected. Real. = realized.
Based on National Bureau of Economic Research survey of urban mortgage
lending; for coverage, see the opening of Chapter 5. Refers to loans secured by
properties other than one- to four-family homes, exclusive of loans and proper-
ties still on the books in 1947. Average yields and loss rates are weighted by the
original amounts of the included loans. Negative loss rates indicate gains.
aBasedon less than fifty loans.
b Not shown because less than ten loans included.116 LENDING EXPERIENCE
TABLE 46
Yields and Loss Rates for Nonfarm Mortgage Loans Made
1920-29, by Loan-to-Value Ratio and Contract Length
LIFE INSURANCE COMPANIES COMMERCIAL BANKS
Exp. Real. Loss Exp. Real. Loss
CONTRACT TERMS YieldYield Rate YieldYield Rate
One-to Four-Family Homes
LOAN-TO-VALUE RATIO
0-39% 5.96% 5.09% 0.87% 6.35% 6.11% 0.24%
40 -79a 5.90 5.19 0.71 6.04 5.52 0.52
CONTRACT LENGTH
0-4 years 5.89 5.02 0.87 6.14 5.57 0.57
5- 9 5.89 5.24 0.65 5.94 5.55 0.39
10 -14 5.99 5.48 0.51 6.18.5.95 0.23
15 -19b 5.97 4.74 1.23 6.10 5.98 0.12
Total 5.92% 5.24% 0.68% 6.08% 5.60% 0.48%
AU Other Property
LOAN-TO-VALUE RATIO
0 -39% 5.55% 5.24% 0.31% 6.04% 5.11% 0.93%












10- 14 5.52 4.58 0.98 5.10 5.05 0.05
15- 19d 5.72 5.16 0.56 e e e
Total 5.61%4.29% 1.32% 5.67% 5.14% 0.53%
Exp. =expected.Real. =realized.
Based on National Bureau of Economic Research survey of urban mortgage
lending; for coverage, see the opening of Chapter 5. Includes loans made during
1920-29 that were extinguished by 1947. Average yields and loss rates are
weighted by the original amounts of the included loans. For number and original
amount of sampled loans, see Table A-14.
Includes 10 loans with loan-to-value ratios of 80 percent and over.
b Includes 21 loans with contract lengths of twenty years and over.
CIncludes6 loans with loan-to-value ratios of 80 percent and over.
d Includes 8 loans with contract lengths of twenty years and over.
eNotshown because less than ten loans included.
Actual versus Contract Length in Mortgage Lending
Less dramatic than foreclosure rates and loss ratios but quite
important as an experience factor is the duration of the investment;
that is, the number of years a mortgage remains on the lender's
books. Interlender differences in average length of investment are
helpful in interpreting yield and loss differentials. Comparisons
between average contract and average actual length of loan—each
weighted by original loan amounts—are also suggestive of dis-LENDING EXPERIENCE 117
crepancies between a lender's "expectations" and actual loan per-
formance.
For sample loans made and extinguished during 1920-47 the
discrepancy between actual and contract term was considerable for
each of the lenders. Relatively few loans were extinguished within
a year of contract maturity. In the part of the sample where com-
pleted experience records are reasonably numerous—namely, among
loans made from 1920 through 1934—a substantial proportion were
extinguished either before or after having reached contract maturity
(Table 47). Although average actual lengths of loans varied from
lender to lender, the variations were much smaller than those ob-
served with respect to average contract lengths. Thus for savings
and loan associations, whose contract lengths averaged substantially
longer than those of the other two lenders, actual duration of invest-
ment fell short of contract length. For life insurance companies, on
the other hand, and still more for commercial banks, the opposite
was observed—average actual duration of loan exceeded average
contract length (Table 48).
A similar pattern of difference among types of lender as to the
relationship of contract length and actual loan performance is evi-
dent when the sample loans are classified by contract maturity.
Because of the limitations of the sample no firm conclusions can be
drawn with respect to the behavior of the small subcategories by
period of origin. Among loans made during the fifteen years 1920-34
it appears that for commercial banks and life insurance companies
about one-tenth of those with short contract maturities (five years
and less), one-half of the middle group (six to ten years), and three-
quarters of the loans with longer maturities (eleven to fifteen years)
were paid off before having reached contract maturity (Table 47)
Forsavings and loan associations, however, the corresponding ratios
generally exceeded those for the other two lenders, and among the
associations' loans with contract lengths of six years and over about
70 percent were repaid before having reached their expected
maturity.
Looking back over the data presented, it can be seen that most of
them point toward a broad similarity in the experience of all prin-
cipal lenders; certainly they reveal no striking differences among
28Heavypay-offs are also indicated for loans with contract terms in excess






















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Average Contract and Realized Maturities for Nonfarm
Mortgage Loans Made 1920-39, by Period Loan Made
LIFE INSURANCE SAVINGS & LOAN
COMPANIES COMMEBCIAL BANKS ASSOCIATIONS
PERIOD ContractRealizedContractRealizedContractRealized
MADE MaturityMaturityMaturityMaturityMaturityMaturity
1920-24 6.1 yrs. 7.9 yrs.3.2 yrs. 7.5 yrs.10.6 yrs.6.9 yrs.
1925-29 6.7 10.8 3.7 8.8 10.7 6.8
1930-34 7.5 8.6 3.4 9.0 10.7 6.0
1935-39 11.3 .4.8 9.0 4.7 14.7 5.5
Based on National Bureau of Economic Research survey of urban mortgage
lending; for coverage, see the opening of Chapter 5. Refers to loans made during
1920-39 that were extinguished by 1947. Average maturities are weighted by
the original amounts of the included loans.
lenders in the major characteristics of their lending patterns.24 The
more subtle variations in lending experience from lender to lender
are difficult to identify because of deficiencies in the size and nature
of the sample of loans on which much of the analysis is based, and
also because of the considerable conceptual complexities involved.
All things considered, it appears that the overwhelming force
exerted by the depression of the thirties, and the widely pervasive
effects of the preceding building boom, resulted in a more or less
uniform experience pattern among all of the major types of mortgage
lending institution. There are indications, also, that factors more
directly associated with the lending operations, uniformly reflected
in the experience of the most diverse lenders, contributed to the
similarity in outcome. However, one must not read more into the
evidence than is warranted by its quality and by its purely empirical
and historical nature. The materials of this chapter have been offered
as merely suggestive; as inviting speculation rather than leading to
inferences, in the strict sense of the word. Viewed thus, the observed
pattern of mortgage lending experience may be thought of as result-
ing from the joint impact exerted by changing over-all economic
forces, and from differences in the aspects of particular loan trans-
24 This statement should perhaps be qualified by pointing out that the
distance lender, by and large, was more likely to foreclose than the local lending
institution, though no corresponding difference in loss experience was observable
once the property was foreclosed. The slightly deviating behavior of the banks
may suggest a real difference or may reflect a bias due to the heavy nonresponse
in that part of the National Bureau's sample.120 LENDING EXPERIENCE
actions customarily referred to as borrower, property, and loan
characteristics.
Indicative of the impact of the general economic climate on lend-
ing experience is the clearly recognizable effect that the year a loan
was made had on the outcome of the lending transaction. For the
period under consideration, it may well have been that the outstand-
ing factor affecting lending experience was the effect of the cycle
time or cycle phase on the value and appraisal of the properties
involved, on the borrowers' income expectations, on the lenders'
willingness to lend and propensity to foreclose, and on the decisions
of mortgage institutions to dispose of acquired properties.
Within the general economic context, and closely interwoven with
each other, operated the factors which characterized particular loan
transactions and resulted in minor differentials in lending experience
as between different groups of loans. Concerning the effects of
various economic characteristics of the property, the borrower, and
the loan, the data reveal that comparatively favorable experience
was associated with relatively small loans secured by modestly
priced properties and extended to middle income borrowers; experi-
ence was also better with loans on owner-occupied homes and other
small residential properties than on large residential structures and
income-producing properties in general; and amortized loans per-
formed better than nonamortized loans. Lower ratios of loan amount
to appraised value of property, shorter contract maturities, and
tighter credit terms in general tended to be inversely associated with
relatively bad experience. To go much further toward general and
far-reaching conclusions is not warranted by the information now
available.
It would, of course, be tempting to ask how the selection of mort-
gage risks could be improved, and how risks associated with differ-
ences in quality among potential mortgage loans could be reduced
by appropriately varying lending standards. Quite obviously, how-
ever, this problem transcends the straightforward application of
actuarial concepts and techniques: experience data, by their very
nature, pertain to a particular situation or historical phase of a
process and are therefore of limited application where rapid and
unexpected changes may take place; moreover, such data are neces-
sarily confined to loans that were actually made, i.e. loans already
selected from a much larger number of potential transactions with
characteristics that probably differed from those of transactions
actually closed. Because of these limitations and of the observedLENDING EXPERIENCE 121
tendency toward greater uniformity of credit terms and loan charac-
teristics generally, it appears unlikely that future lending activity
will produce experience data that could make it materially easier to
discriminate safely, yet in sufficient detail, between potential loans
of different quality.
On the other hand, there seems little doubt that experience in-
formation of a better and more reliable kind is genuinely needed.
It could be made particularly useful to the lending officer if careful
foreclosure analysis and current analysis of serious delinquencies
and of prepayments were to become a matter of course. Such an
intensive approach seems the more promising as many of the relevant
experience factors (for example, neighborhood change) do not lend
themselves easily to inclusion in the more extensive, actuarial type
of analysis. Moreover, the evidence suggests that for the improve-
ment of lending policies increased importance must be attributed
to the correct observation and analysis of conditions in the economy
as a whole: to factors affecting loan experience that extend far
beyond the horizon of individual mortgage transactions.